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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CURTIS LEE JONES 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890015 
THE JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from conviction on the charges of 
burglary a second degree felony, and theft a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code annotated 76-6-202 & 76-6-404 
respectively, rendered by a jury impaneled before the Honorable 
David E. Roth. Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
annotated, 77-35-26(2)(e) (1953) as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendants 
guilt of burglary. 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendants 
guilt of theft. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-202 (1978) : burglary. 
1. A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or a theft or commit an assault on 
any person. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404 (1978) : theft. 
1. A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with the 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on the charges of 
burglary and theft both second degree felonies folLowing a jury 
trial before the Honorable Judge David E. Roth on the 14th day of 
November 1988. Defendant was sentenced on both charges on the 
7th day of December 1988 to serve a term in the Utah State Prison 
of not less than one (1) and not more than fifteen (15) years for 
each charge. 
The Defendant filed for post conviction relief 
requesting that he be granted an appeal which was received by the 
Clerk of the Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of 
Utah on the 11th day of January, 1989. The Defendant filed a 
motion for appointment of counsel on the 10th day of February 
1989. 
This appeal, which was directed to the Court of Appeals 
for the State of Utah, for which, on the 4th day of January 1989, 
Benjamin Simms, Clerk of the Court of Appeals, by and through his 
deputy, Tammy Anderson, filed a certificate on Appeal No. 890015 
on the 21st day of February 1989. 
2 
That on the 2 8th day of February 1989 the Defendant 
signed the affidavit of Impecuniosity which was filed on the 15th 
day of March 1989 with the Clerk of Weber County, and that 
counsel, Bernard L. Allen, was appointed to represent the 
Defendant as the result of the Defendants motion for appointment 
of counsel to represent him in this appeal which was received by 
the Clerk of the District Court of Weber County on the 10th day 
of February 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 9th day of August 1988, at approximately 8:30 
o,clock p.m., Ms. Thea Olsen of 3474 Adams Avenue, Ogden, Utah 
was at home asleep when she was awakened by the neighbors dog 
barking. The dog continued to bark for about 15 minutes which 
caused Ms. Olsen to get up and go outside and see what the dog 
was barking at or to go quiet the dog. (Tp. 35, 36, and 37) . 
The witness started towards the neighbors front door at 347 0 
Adams Avenue which was wide open and noticed that there were two 
(2) people squatting under or near a pine tree. (Tp. 37) The 
witness squatted down and pronounced the name "Mike11 which is the 
neighbors name at home at 3470 Adams. She asked " Mike is that 
you?" The witness indicates that one individual started to take 
off and the other one ran into her knocking her over. A large 
rock rolled by her. Ms. Olsen then indicates that after she 
fell on her bottom this individual then took off towards the back 
of the house out of the driveway to the side of the garage and 
she began to chase him. (Tp. 40). Ms. Olsen then indicates (Tp. 
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40, 41) that she cut between the garage and house and observed 
one suspect go through an opening in the fence and head north. 
The other individual, bounced off the fence. (Tp. 41) At this 
time Ms. Olsen observed this suspect jump over the fence so she 
went to her truck and gave pursuit after this suspect. Ms. 
Olsen's truck was parked directly in front of her home at 3474 
Adams Avenue. (Tp. 41) Ms. Olsen continued up and around the 
corner proceeding north, turning right heading east on the corner 
of 3 3rd Street. There's an alley in the back running north and 
south. Ms. Olsen went to the north entrance and went as far as 
she could in her vehicle. At this point she observed the one 
suspect jump over a fence when he observed Ms. Olsen7s truck. 
Ms. Olsen indicates that her high beams were on and that the 
suspect was wearing a two-toned shirt white with colored sleeves. 
Ms. Olsen testifies that this person was not the person that she 
had bumped into. (Tp. 41, 42). Ms. Olsen indicated that the one 
she bumped into had on dark clothing (Tp. 42) . Ms. Olsen backed 
up and turned around and turned her high beams on and believed 
she saw someone in the shadow. When this person observed Ms. 
Olsen he took off and went up and around the corner back towards 
3474 Adams with Ms Olsen in pursuit. She saw the suspect jump 
into a truck near the front of her home. Ms. Olsen then told 
Carrie, her roommate, to get in the truck and then followed the 
suspect (Tp. 42) . The suspect drove a dark colored truck that 
was described as a small Nissan, (Tp. 42) . Ms. Olsen followed 
close behind the Nissan, in fact almost bumper to bumper for a 
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short time, and she observed one person in the truck (Tp. 43) . 
Ms. Olsen indicates that the best view she received of this 
suspect was at the victims house when the individual bumped into 
her. (Tp. 44) Ms. Olsen testified that she didn't pay very close 
attention to the clothing, only that it was dark and that the 
individual was wearing a baseball cap. She identified the person 
who bumped into her, and who drove away in the Nissan truck as 
the Defendant, Curtis L. Jones. (Tp. 45) (Tp. 44, 45, 46) Ms. 
Olsen was shown a photo line-up by the police in which three 
different suspects of different builds were shown to her and she 
picked the Defendant. Ms. Olsen and her roommate followed that 
vehicle to about 31st and Grant where they lost it but did write 
down the temporary sticker number F03794. It was later 
determined that the temporary sticker was issued to a Cindy B. 
Roan at 442 S State #131, Clearfield, Utah. Cindy Roan is the 
Defendants girlfriend and roommate at the residence in 
Clearfield, Utah. The witness, Ms. Olsen then returned home 
where she was met by several Ogden City Police officers which had 
been summoned by her neighbor when Ms. Olsen was knocked to the 
ground. 
The other witness Carrie M. Bell was called and 
testified at the trial that she was Thea Olsen's roommate and she 
too was asleep and awakened by the dog barking. She got up and 
got dressed in time to observe Ms. Olsen running back into the 
house indicating that the neighbors house was being burglarized. 
At this point Ms. Bell grabbed her keys and assisted Ms. Olsen in 
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chasing the suspects from the back yard (Tp. 62). Ms. Bell 
testified that she was told by Ms. Olsen to get in the truck and 
noticed that a black truck was parked just past the neighbors 
driveway and an individual getting into it (Tp. 63) . Ms. Bell 
then pointed the suspect out to Ms. Olsen and they followed this 
truck. Ms. Bell indicated that he was African-American and she 
could not determine his clothing. Ms. Bell testified (Tp. 63,64) 
that she wrote the new temporary sticker number down that was 
displayed in the pick-ups rear window. She observed the side of 
the suspects face and his eyes through the rear view mirror on 
the drivers side (Tp. 64) . She testified she observed the 
suspect as having acne or scars with a thin face. Ms. Bell 
testified (Tp. 66) that she was unable to identify the person she 
saw in the truck on that night. 
Mr. Jones was taken to the police department and 
interviewed by John Stubbs of the Ogden City Police Dept. 
Detective Stubbs testified in the trial that he questioned Mr. 
Jones after Mr. Jones was read and waived his Miranda Rights. At 
which time Mr. Jones indicated to the detective that at roughly 
7:30 p.m. on the night of the crime that one Galviston Scott had 
asked to borrow "his" truck which was a Nissan pick-up truck so 
that he could jump start a car. Mr. Jones indicated that he did 
in fact loan his vehicle to Galviston Scott and that he didn't 
see Mr. Scott or his truck the rest of that evening (Tp. 69, 70). 
Detective Stubbs testified that according to AP&P's record Mr. 
Jones was checked at his residence in Clearfield at B:36 p.m. the 
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evening of the 9th by his parole officer, Don Bench from Davis 
County, (Tp. 81, 82) • The Defendant denied any involvement in 
this incident. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence of Defendants guilt was insufficient to 
demonstrate his guilt of burglary and or theft. Given the 
circumstances involved in this case the hour of day, the 
darkness, the location, the events that were going on in addition 
to the witness's own testimony as to her inconclusive clothing 
descriptions, and actual limited face-to-face confrontation with 
the suspect, it is clear that the evidence induced at the trial 
is not so probable or conclusive that the Defendants guilt was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT OF BURGLARY 
The standard established for an Appellate review of the 
sufficiency of evidence is well established. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
"It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the 
facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the 
lines most favorable to the verdict; and that if 
when so viewed it appears that the jury acting 
fairly and reasonably could find the Defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict will 
not be disturbed." 
Citing case State vs Ward, 347 P. 2d 865, 869 (1959 footnote 
omitted.) 
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The Utah State Supreme Court has held in State vs Booker, 
709 P.2d, 342 Utah 1985: 
"That we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted". 
See also State vs McCardell, 652 P.2d, 942 (Utah 1982), State vs 
Martinez., 709 P.2d, 355 (Utah 1985). However, the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated an unwillingness to stretch the inference 
beyond gaps in the evidence as in the case of State vs Petree, 
659 P.2d, 443,444 (Utah 1983), where the Court said: 
"Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the 
jury's decision this Court still has the right to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the 
Defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt." 
The Defendant was convicted of Burglary, a Second Degree 
Felony, because the building in question was a dwelling. 76-6-202 
of Utah Code Annotated indicated that: 
"A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion 
of a building with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on a person." 
7 6-6-4 04 Utah Code Annotated, under theft, 
indicates that a "person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercised an unauthorized control over 
the property of another with the purpose to 
deprive him thereof." 
To convict the Defendant of these two charges the jury 
not only had to find that under the definition of those two 
statutes a burglary and a theft actually did occur but also that 
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they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
actually was present at the scene and perpetrated those two 
offenses. 
The focus of this appeal is whether the jury could 
reasonably believe that Ms. Olsen positively identified the 
suspect Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones testified adamantly at the trial 
that his vehicle was lent out that night to another individual 
and that he was personally observed by his parole officer to be 
at his home residence in Clearfield, Utah starting at the hour of 
8:36 p.m. on night of this alleged burglary. The State of Utah 
stipulated that if the parole officer had been called he would in 
fact have testified that he did indeed initiate a parole visit to 
Mr. Jones at that h£>ur on the night of the burglary. According 
to Ms. Olsen, she heard a disturbance at the victims home 
starting at about 8:30 to 10:00, (Tp.58 line 23). She indicates 
that she heard the dog barking for from 15 to 2 0 minutes (Tp.3 6 
line 20) . She further testified that at the time she came 
outside her house after the dog had been barking for about 15 or 
20 minutes, that the individual had already committed the 
burglary. It is unknown, however, how long the perpetrators were 
actually inside the victims house, although 2 0 minutes would be a 
reasonable indication of that time. No evidence was presented at 
trial as to the length of time it would take to drive from the 
Defendants residence in Clearfield to the victims home on 34th 
Street and Adams. In this case, according to the witnesses, 
there were two individuals committing the burglary at the victims 
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residence and therefore, there would apparently be the 
requirement that the Defendant not only drive all the way from 
Clearfield to Ogden and commit a burglary in less than 3 0 
minutes, but that he also make arrangements for and pick up 
another individual. As the identity of the second individual was 
never brought into evidence, there is no evidence proven by the 
State as to who that individual was or where he came from. The 
Defendant logically points out that the State not only failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he could have performed this 
feat of speed and dexterity but in fact it stretches beyond the 
limits of possibility for him to have been the perpetrator of 
this offense. Of the two witnesses that testified, only Ms. 
Olsen was able to cite an opinion regarding whether the 
Defendant was one of the persons committing the burglary that 
night. She testified that as she came from behind the tree, she 
bumped into an individual who she indicated was black, wearing 
dark clothing and a baseball cap. She testified that the 
collision knocked her right down. She also testified that she 
had an opportunity to see the person face-to-face, however, it is 
clear from her description of this incident that she was 
surprised by an individual coming around the tree and almost 
immediately found herself falling backwards. In cross-
examination, the witness indicated that she identified him only 
from the instantaneous "brush-by" with the person at the scene 
(T. 56 line 6). She also testified in cross-examination that she 
had admitted at the preliminary hearing to not being able to make 
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any identification of the person driving while he was in the 
truck. In addition, this all occurred at night and although there 
was some moderate lighting from porch lights in the area, there 
was no direct light on the subject at the place behind the tree 
where she brushed by the person at the scene. Ms. Olsen 
testified that shortly after the incident occurred, she was shown 
only three photographs of three black males who, according to 
her, had significantly different builds and from that photograph 
she selected thej picture of the Defendant. Those three 
photographs were introduced to the jury at the trial. It is a 
well recognized probability that once a witness locks in on a 
photograph of an individual who she feels may resemble the person 
committing an offence, that from that time on it is difficult to 
discern whether at trial the witness is actually identifying the 
Defendant as the person who perpetrated the offense or as the 
person she recalls from the photograph that she identified. Ms. 
Olsen makes some intriguing statements regarding follow up 
identification made of the Defendant by looking at him through 
the rear-view mirror his truck. This testimony is almost a 
classic example of the witness attempting to solidify her own 
testimony and indeed possibly her own fear of making a mistake as 
it is completely illogical to believe that an individual could be 
visible through the rear-view mirror of his vehicle in the middle 
of the night without any direct lighting on his face. Therefore, 
it is not logical and maybe impossible that the witness actually 
saw discernable features in the rear-view mirror of the vehicle. 
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This is confirmed by Carrie Bells testimony that she could not 
identify the driver of the black Nissan even though she was 
unhindered by the demands of driving the vehicle she was in as 
Ms. Olsen was. Thompson vs City of Louisville, 4 L.2d 654 
Harris vs United States, 404 U.S. 1232, and Jackson vs Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307. 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly states in Marsh vs Irvine, 
449 P. 2d, 996, 998, the Defendants position in regard to this 
case: 
"We agree that the jury should not be allowed 
such unbridled license as to base its verdict 
upon something which would be a physical 
impossibility.11 See also 
Haarstrich vs Oregon S.L.R.R. Co. 262 P.2d, 100. 
The United States Court of Appeals in 7th Circuit 
indicates in Webster vs Duckworth, 767 F.2d, 1206, (1985), 
ruled: 
"That the absence of competence substantive 
evidence to support a verdict of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, whether the result of 
prosecutorial inability, judicial error or 
recalcitrant witness requires acquittal either at 
trial or on appeal." 
The Supreme Court of Washington considered this general rule in 
the case of State vs Allen, 574 P. 2d, 1182, (1978) where the 
Court ruled that: 
"Doubt of guilt cannot co-exist with conviction 
of guilt; any fact in evidence may, under 
particular circumstances, raise doubt of guilt 
which would not otherwise exist, if doubt is 
raised, it follows that jury is not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt of Defendant 
and must acquit." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah confirmed the 
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Defendant's theory in the case of State vs Mecham, 456 P.2d 156, 
(19 69); where although the Court affirmed the Defendant's 
conviction, the Court indicated that: 
"Not withstanding the fact that exact date of 
indecent assault was never made a particular 
issue at the trial by notice of alibi or 
otherwise, except as witnesses were questioned as 
to what happened on that date, State had the 
burden to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and this evidence of 
Defendant's being elsewhere was sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt as to his being involved 
in the crime, he should be acquitted." 
This language relates to the present case and shows that 
the Supreme Court is cognizant of the potentiality of a jury 
conviction when the facts seem to preclude the possibility of 
the Defendant actually committing the offense. The Court is 
clear in its assertion that in such a case the Defendant is to be 
acquitted. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be used in Utah 
regarding sufficiency of the evidence in State vs Romero, 554 
P.2d, 216, 1976: 
"The status is of the standard for determining 
sufficiency of evidence is whether it is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds could not reasonably believe the 
Defendant had committed a crime." 
In the present case the jury gave unreasonable 
credibility to the testimony of Ms. Olsen in believing her 
identification of the Defendant, and apparently because of that 
evidence, disregarded the physical impossibility of the 
Defendant being in two places at once, that is, at home 2 0 or 3 0 
minutes away from the scene of the crime at 8:36 when the 
witnesses testified that the individuals had been in the house 
from between 8:30 and 9:10 on that evening. 
In addition to the lack of credible identification 
evidence against the Defendant in this case, the record is 
completely void of any evidence whatsoever that either of the 
black individuals at the scene were ever seen inside of the 
house, entering the house, or leaving the house. Looking at the 
evidence from the best position the State has, one can only 
determine that these individuals were outside the house near a 
tree and that they were later seen running down the driveway. 
Without this necessary connection between the individual 
tenuously identified as the Defendant at the scene, and the 
actual act of burglary or theft, the Defendant is convinced that 
it was a reversible error to even allow the case to go to the 
jury. The Defendant defends his position with the basic rule 
that a conviction without evidence of guilt clearly violates his 
rights to due process of law. 
The Defendant points to the precedence set in United 
States Supreme Court in Sandstrom vs Montana, 442 US 510, 1979; 
in which the Court ruled that jury may not be instructed that: 
"The law presumes that a person intends the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 
Because of the 14th Amendment Due Process requirement, 
that the State must prove each and every element of a defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt and to accept the quoted presumption 
conflicts with the stronger and overriding presumption of 
innocence, which everyone accused of offense is entitled to. 
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The Utah Supreme Court followed this ruling in the case 
of Utah vs Walton, 646 P.2d 689. The Defendant argues that this 
line of cases precludes situations, such as in the current case, 
where the Defendant is not placed inside the house, entering the 
house or leaving the victims house and that, therefore, the jury 
is being expected to presume that because he was tenuously 
identified as being in the area, that he must have in fact 
committed the burglary charged by the State. Such a presumption 
without any direct evidence is clearly violative of the 
Defendants 14th Amendment to due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant Curtis Lee Jones was improperly charged and 
convicted of burglary and theft in violation of the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The Defendant alleges that the jury convicted him on no 
substantial evidence that he m fact committed this crime, and 
that the evidence presented at trial proved the improbability 
even the impossibility that he could have been in two places at 
once making it froitl Clearfield to the address of the victim under 
the circumstances $.escribed at trial. That, therefore, because 
of the faulty identification and evidence discrediting that 
identification he is entitled to an acquittal on these two 
charges. Inherent within this insufficiency of the evidence 
argument is the Defendants assertion that the jury in this case 
was made to presume that the person identified at the scene had 
committed burglary of the victim Mike Jenkin's home even though 
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the Defendant was not seen either inside the home, nor entering 
or leaving the home and was not placed personally in possession 
of any property identified as being stolen. 
The Defendant concludes that this presumption made 
against the individual identified at the scene even if the 
evidence were deemed sufficient to show that that individual was 
the Defendant would violate the Defendants constitutional rights 
to due process as protected by the 14th Amendment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^CJ day of May, 1989. 
:torney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
postage prepaid this //() day of May, 1939. 
TARETL. 'ALLEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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76-6-202 CRIMINAL CODE 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein 
and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or 
vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises 
when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or re-
maining are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any par t of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted "by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 195, § 76-6-201. Burglary<S^l 
Cross-References. 12 C J S Burglary § L 
Civil provisions, entry and detainer, 78-
36-1. 
13 Am. Jur. 2d 320, Burglary § 1. 
76-6-202. Burglary.— (1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202. 
Cross-References. 
Agreement to commit burglary, conspir-
acy, 76-4-201. 
l e s s e r included offenses. 
I t vras not error for the court, at t r ial 
of defendant on a charge of a t tempted 
burglary, to refuse to instruct the jury on 
the offense of possession of an instrument 
for burglary or theft, as denned by 76-6-
205, since that offense was not necessarily 
embraced within the crime of burglary. 
State v. Sunter, 550 P . 2d 184. 
Collateral References. 
Burg la rvC^9(2) . 
12 C.J S. Burglary § 10. 
13 Am. Jur . 2d 326, Burglary § 10. 
Breaking and entering of inner door of 
building as burglary, 43 A. L. R. 3d 1147. 
Burglarv without breaking, 23 A. L. R. 
288. 
Criminal prosecution based upon break-
ing into or taking money or goods from 
vending machine or other coin-operated 
machine, 45 A. L. R. 3d 1286. 
Larceny, conviction or acquit ta l of as 
bar to prosecution for burglary, 19 A. L. R. 
626. 
Maintainabil i ty of burglary charge, 
where entry into building is made with 
consent, 93 A. L. R. 2d 531. 
Necessity and sufficiency of allegations 
in indictment or infoimation for burglary 
as to value of property intended to be 
stolen which would make i ts theft a 
felony, 113 A. L. R. 1269. 
Opening closed but unlocked door as 
breaking which will sustain charge of bur-
glary or breaking and entering, 23 A. L. R. 
112. 
Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as 
affecting its character as a "dwell ing" as 
regards burglary, 85 A. L. R. 428. 
What is a "building" or "house" within 
burglary statutes, 78 A. L. R. 2d 778. 
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planation, was to be deemed prima facie 
evidence of guilt, jury did not determine 
if explanation was sat isfactory; they de-
termined whether, on all evidence in the 
case, they were convinced beyond reason-
able doubt of defendant 's guil t ; an expla-
nation may have been satisfactory to jury 
and yet defendant found guilty because 
other evidence may have, notwithstanding, 
convinced them beyond reasonable doubt 
of his guilt; explanation may have been 
unsatisfactory, and proved, or admittedly 
false, and yet jury could acquit because 
they were not convinced beyond reason-
able doubt of defendant 's guilt. S ta te v. 
Brooks, 101 TJ. 584, 126 P . 2d 1044. 
His tory: C. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by 
L. 1973, clL 196, § 76-6-403; I/. 1974, ch. 32, 
§17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1974 amendment substi tuted "sec-
tions 76-6-404 through 76-6-410" for "sec-
tions 76-6-403 through 76-6-411." 
History: O. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404, 
Cross-Beferences. 
Motor vehicles special anti-theft laws, 
41-1-105 to 41-1-121. 
Shoplifting Act, 78-11-14 et seq. 
Comment of defendant 's silence. 
Where defendant charged with theft of 
building materials from construction site 
did not testify in his own defense and 
offered no evidence to explain his late-
night presence a t the site, prosecutor's 
comment tha t : "The defense has presented 
no evidence as to why defendant was out 
there. What was he doing out there?" was 
Theft out of s tate . 
Utah court had jurisdiction to t ry 
defendants on charge of grand larceny 
where defendants stole car in Texas and 
drove i t to Utah. Conners v. Turner, 29 U. 
(2d) 311, 508 P . 2d 1185. 
Uncorroborated explanation of possession. 
Evidence was sufficient to support con-
viction for grand larceny where recently 
stolen pistol was found in car in which 
defendant was riding and where de-
fendant 's claim tha t he purchased pistol 
several months earlier in bar was not sup-
ported by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Sta te v. Pappacostas, 17 U. (2d) 
197, 407 P. 2d 576. 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence winch establishes receiving 
stolen pioperty under section 76-6-40S is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft 
without the necessitv of establishing theft 
by t ak ing . State v / T a y l o i , 570 P. 2d 697. 
Collateral References. 
Single or separate larceny predicated 
upon stealing property £rom different own-
ers a t the same time, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1182. 
a legi t imate comment on what the to ta l 
evidence did or did not show; i t was not 
impermissible comment on defendant 's 
failure to testify. S ta te v. Kazda, 540 P . 
2d 949. 
Elements of offense. 
S ta te is not required to prove conclu-
sively who the real owner of the proper ty 
is, bu t only tha t the defendant obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the 
proper ty of another. State v. Simmons, 
573 P . 2d 341. 
Evidence establishing theft . 
Evidence which establishes the receiv-
ing of stolen property under section 76-6-
76-6-403. Theft—Evidence to support accusation.—Conduct denomi-
nated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate 
offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, lar-
ceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiv-
ing stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence 
that it vras committed in any manner specified in sections 76-6-404 through 
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting 
a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the de-
fense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respectn e numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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